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Abstract 
 
This article examines Martin Buber’s contribution to the theory and practice of 
psychotherapy. A brief biographical sketch is provided, followed by an explanation of 
his dialogical philosophy of I and Thou. This provides the basis for presentation of his 
critiques of Freud and Jung. The article concludes with implications of Buber’s work for 
research and practice in Christian psychotherapy, and recommendations for further 
reading.   
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The thought of Martin Buber, especially his religious-poetical classic I and Thou 
(1937/2003), has had a profound and sustained impact on such diverse fields of study as 
political Zionism, anthropology, Christian theology, education, psychiatry, philosophy, 
and most importantly here psychotherapy (e.g., Agassi, 1999; Friedman, 2002). With a 
career spanning six decades, Buber (1878-1965) was one of the great Judeo-Christian 
thinkers of the 20th century, and was often consulted in ethical and political problems of 
the human condition (Jääskeläinen, 2000). Similar to a number of his predecessors, such 
as Blake, Dostoyevsky and Pascal, Buber foresaw the desacralisation of western society, 
in what he called the Eclipse of God (1952). He believed that modern thinking, 
characterized by secularism, scientism and rampant individualism had become so 
entrenched in modern life that humanity was becoming more and more isolated from 
God and each other.  
Although Buber did not himself advance a psychotherapeutic system, his 
engagement with therapists and psychological ideas was persistent throughout his career 
(Katz, 1975). However, it was following the publication of I and Thou, that Buber 
realized “psychotherapists began to be interested to want to talk with me” (Buber, 
1967a). Based upon his Judeo-Christian understanding of the psyche and humans’ 
relation to God, he then provided a detailed critique of psychoanalytic theory and 
methodology. Buber’s theory of dialogue was first received into the field of 
psychoanalysis through the work of Jungian Swiss psychiatrist, Hans Trüb (Zank, 2004). 
He then had a number of fruitful dialogues with Freud, Jung, Rogers and Victor White, 
amongst others. While Buber’s understanding of therapy was most closely aligned with 
Rogers person-centred therapy (see Friedman, 1994), it was his critique of Freud and 
Jung, which arguably produced the most important addition to the psychotherapeutic 
literature. This essay will discuss and evaluate the impact of Buberian thought, 
specifically his dialogical philosophy of I and Thou, on psychotherapy. Areas of 
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discussion are: a brief biographical sketch of Buber; an explanation of his dialogical 
philosophy – I and Thou; an analysis of his dialogues with Freud and Jung; and the 
implications of Buber’s dialogical theory for Christian psychotherapy.  
Martin Buber, the Man and Scholar 
Buber’s life experiences and education played a major role in shaping and 
defining his work. Born in Vienna in 1878, Buber lost both parents at the age of three. A 
close friend and associate of Buber, Ernst Simon (1973), has suggested that his “. . . 
search after his long lost mother became a strong motive for his dialogical thinking - his 
I –Thou philosophy” (p. 359). Following his loss, he was raised and educated by his 
grandparents. His paternal grandfather, who was a renowned Talmudic scholar, had a 
significant impact on the development of his grandson’s academic abilities and interests. 
Other influential events in Buber’s life, which all left an indelible mark on him, were the 
impact of the First World War, the murder of his close friend Gustav Landauer, and the 
horrors of the Holocaust (Friedman, 1991).  
Perhaps the most significant episode in Buber’s early life and the development of 
his dialogic theory, was a period of suicidal depression and introspection in his teenage 
years. Uncharacteristic of a fourteen-year old boy, Buber had been tormented about the 
“absurd” nature of time and its relationship to eternity and his finitude existence. Of all 
things it was reading Kant’s Prolegomena to All Future Metaphysics that he called “my 
salvation”, which lifted Buber out of this despair. He surprisingly identified a mystical 
quality in Kant’s work and glimpsed the possibility of a real “meeting” between himself, 
God, and others (Friedman, 1991, p. 17). This led to a reliance on Kantian epistemology 
in the evolution of his philosophic anthropology (Katz, 1984). Buber’s description of an 
It is in part derived from Kant’s understanding of phenomenal knowledge, and Kant’s 
notion of noumenal knowledge provides a basis for Buber’s Thou.    
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His personalist philosophy of dialogue can be traced back to his doctoral 
dissertation, which explored the theories of individuation in the works of two great 
mystics, Nicholas of Cusa and Jakob Böhme (Friedman, 1991). During these early years 
Buber also engaged in the study of psychology and clinical psychiatry under Wilhem 
Wundt, the founder of experimental psychology (Stephens, 2001). Most significantly 
Buber then engaged in a life-long study of Hasidism, a movement that arose during the 
late 18th century amongst the European Jewry. Many orthodox Jews regarded Hasidism 
as “revolutionary and religiously liberal” (Telushkin, 1991, p. 214) because it focused on 
a personal relationship with God and one’s relationships with others, the foundational 
tenets of Buber’s I and Thou.  
Buber’s I and Thou and its influence on psychology, psychopathology and 
psychotherapy, can only be fully understood in relation to his Hasidic wisdom writings 
(Agassi, 1999). Although Buber’s concept of the I and Thou relation is primarily based 
upon Hasidism he also explored the mystical traditions of other religions, such as 
Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism. This played a major role in his early 
developmental thinking and his philosophy of dialogue (Friedman, 1986). For Buber, the 
mystical unity postulated in Christian mysticism, Buddhism and Hinduism contradicts 
our essential experience of the world and each other. Buber explicitly denied being a 
mystic of the ilk of Meister Eckhardt or St Paul, who he classes as adherents of 
Gnosticism (Bertman, 2000). In his essay With a Monist (1914), he states 
No I am not a mystic . . . the mystic manages, truly or apparently, to annihilate 
the entire world, or what he so names . . . But I am enormously concerned with 
just this world, this painful and precious fullness of what I see, hear, taste (p. 28)                             
For the discipline of psychotherapy, the most salient aspects of Buber’s Hasidic teaching 
is his notion of “hallowing the everyday” and “healing through meeting” in the 
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therapeutic relationship (Hycner, 1991). These concepts are based upon his philosophic 
anthropology of I and Thou.  
I and Thou  
In line with other thinkers, such as Protestant theologian Paul Tillich and 
Catholic existentialist Gabriel Marcel, Buber was unhappy with the idea of God as an 
“object” of human experience (Griffith-Dickinson, 2000). For Buber the objectification 
of God lay in the “. . . great deception in Europe of the last three hundred years: the 
rationalism and idealism which have typified philosophical thought since Descartes” 
(Horwitz, 1978, p. 229). In response, Buber (1937/2003) conceptualized his dialogical 
philosophy that explains the “self” in terms of relationships instead of what he called the 
“severed I”. He proposes two attitudinal relationships for the ‘I’: the I-Thou and the I-it. 
These form the basis for his anthropological dualism and in turn, inform his 
understanding of spiritual healing within psychotherapy.     
The I-Thou relationship relates to a deep and mysterious personal engagement 
with the other, the other being the Thou. The Thou is not an object and has two 
dimensions. The first form of dialogical meeting as a Thou, is when two people 
encounter one another in a relationship characterized by “mutuality” and reciprocal love. 
In a psychotherapeutic context, this is a sacred moment when “the deepest self of the 
therapist meets the deepest self of the client” (Rugala & Waldo, 1998, p. 68).   Secondly, 
the most fundamental and mysterious form of dialogical meeting is with the eternal Thou. 
The “God . . . him who – whatever else He may be – enters into a direct relation with us 
men in creative, revealing and redeeming acts, and thus makes it possible for us to enter 
into a direct relation with him” (Buber, 1937/2003, p. 75). Integral to both the Jewish 
and Christian traditions is the premise that whenever you have dialogue with another 
human being you are at the same time engaging with God (Mk. 12: 29-31). Accordingly, 
Buber concludes that “the relation to a human-being is the proper metaphor for the 
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relation to God” (Buber, 1937/2003, p. 81). Here we see the religious-existential 
character of Buber’s work in that he views God, not in abstract ontological terms, but in 
the concreteness of Abraham’s encounter with God (Bertman, 2000). Thus God, as the 
manifestation of perfect love is always foundationally involved in the encounter between 
therapist and patient.  
 The I-it relationship is diametrically apposed to the I-Thou, and is based upon 
the axioms of logical empiricism/positivism: objectivity, determinism, abstractive 
contemplation, and a utilitarian approach to the other. Buber does not deny that we live 
in a world of facts, and objects, and views philosophy itself as the “highest expression” 
of the I-it relation (Buber, 1952, p. 43). Psychotherapist Richard Hycner (1991), the co-
Director for the Institute for Dialogical Therapy, notes that the I-it attitude is often 
misconceived and misunderstood as not being at all relevant to everyday living. But, “it 
is not the existence of the I-it attitude that is ‘wrong’ but rather its overwhelming 
predominance that manifests itself in modern technocratic society” (Hycner, 1991, p. 6). 
If psychotherapists adopt an authoritarian and predominantly rational and 
methodological approach to their clients, they will inevitably enter the world of I-it, 
resulting in “alienation” of the other. This was the crux of Buber’s polemic of Sigmund 
Freud’s psychoanalytic method, “. . . which presumes an omniscient analyst dealing with 
curiously foolish neurotics” (Agassi, 1999, p. xxiv). This type of I-it relationship views 
the other person as an object to be analyzed (subject-object relation) rather than 
approaching the person in a relational manner. 
The Buber – Freud Dialogue  
Buber considered Freud as a “late born apostle of the enlightenment”, who’s 
psychoanalytic hypothesis comprised mainly of a struggle against metaphysics and 
religious belief (Buber, 1999a, p. 2). He was scathing of Freud’s sweeping 
generalizations and during the rebirth of the spiritual in psychology in the 1960s he stated 
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that, “Fifty years of psychotherapeutic thought have been based on this dangerous 
thinking. Now this period is at an end” (Buber, 1967a, p. 157). Buber can then be seen as 
a prophet of modern times where “. . . unremitting Freud-bashing has achieved novel 
heights” (Agassi, 1999, p. xx) in most intellectual circles. Nevertheless, Freudian theory 
has had a monumental impact on 20th century thought and especially our understanding 
of the workings of the mind.  
Buber was highly critical of the “. . . power implications built into the orthodox 
Freudian analytic situation” (Agassi, 1999, p. xxiv). Leslie H. Farber (1967), a 
psychotherapist and sympathizer of Buber’s ideas, suggests that when Freud observed a 
person’s behavior he saw “. . . megalomania, narcissism – libidinal drives operating in 
isolation, abstracted from human experience” (p. 582). For Buber, Freud’s thinking was 
a “. . . science that had detached itself from a comprehensive context” (Buber, 1999a, p. 
111), and did not account for the complex interpersonal social and cultural relations of a 
person’s life. Freud was principally concerned with the intrapsychic dimension and all 
but discounted the “interhuman” within his psychological theory (Freidman, 1985). 
Buber’s assault on Freud’s psychotherapeutic model was twofold. He rejected Freud’s 
conception of the origin and treatment of guilt, and also his authoritarian and utilitarian 
understanding of the therapeutic relationship.   
In his essay Guilt and Guilt Feelings, originally published in 1957, Buber 
provided a detailed and trenchant critique of Freud’s central idea of “guilt feelings”, laid 
out in Totem and Taboo (1960/1915) and Moses and Monotheism (1974/1939). Freud 
conceived guilt as a neurosis that is borne from social and parental taboos – the 
“superego”. These taboos and social norms are rooted in primeval religions, wherein 
patriarchal toteism was formed. Congruent with Freud’s dualistic conception of the 
conscious and unconscious, he saw the root of guilt feelings as perceived transgressions 
from these ancient and modern taboos. These feelings of guilt are then repressed in the 
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unconscious, especially in childhood and may lead to psychopathology in adult life 
(Palmer, 1997).     
Buber rejects Freud’s understanding of guilt, suggesting that in his theory there is 
“. . . no place for guilt in the ontological sense, unless it be the relationship of man to 
himself” (Buber, 1999a, p. 114). He makes a distinction between what he calls 
“existential guilt” and Freud’s “groundless neurotic guilt”. Buber defines guilt as “guilt 
that a person has taken on himself as a person and in a personal situation – cannot be 
comprehended through such categories of analytical science as ‘repression’” (p. 116). 
Contrary to Freud, Buber views individual guilt as an “injury” to the “. . . order of the 
human world whose foundations he knows and recognizes as those of his own existence 
and of all common human existence” (p. 116). In short, he sees existential guilt as a 
violation of the common good, in the sphere of the inter-human.  
Rather than embarking on an archaeological dig into the depths of the 
unconscious, as Freud would, Buber suggests three steps to overcoming existential guilt. 
First, “illuminate the guilt”, that is openly confessing our guilt to other persons and God. 
It is within this stage of learning about self, that Buber suggests the patient experiences 
“the shudder of identity” (Katz, 1975, p. 424), which is the genesis of healing and 
personal growth. Second, we have to “persevere in that illumination, not as an anguished 
torment but as strong broad light” (Friedman, 2002, p. 18). This leads into the third and 
perhaps most important step of “repairing the injured order of existence” (p. 18). As 
individuals are always guilty in relation to others, this final step allows for reconciliation 
with other persons and in turn God, the ground of the I-Thou relation. Accordingly 
human sin is fundamental in Buber’s understanding of guilt and how we can overcome it. 
It is our confession through the I-Thou encounter with another that Buber suggests 
allows for “religious confession”, which “. . . means dialogue with the absolute divine 
person who replies in mysterious fashion out of his mystery” (Buber, 1999a, p. 127). If 
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Buber views confession of sin to God as crucial in the healing of human guilt, how then 
does this affect his understanding of the therapeutic relationship? 
According to Freud, the only time during therapy when the two “selves” of the 
therapist and patient meet is during the process of transference and countertransference. 
In striving to remain faithful to his “science” of psychoanalysis, Freud battled against his 
humanistic desires and was very critical of the relational approach of other 
psychotherapists, such as Sandor Ferenczi (Freidman, 1985). Predictably, Buber 
objected to Freud’s deterministic thesis. He saw the Freudian approach as “a well-
regulated game”, which views the patient as an object, an I-it relation (Buber, 1999a, p. 
111). Within this game the therapist only tries to understand the guilt feelings in terms of 
repressed memories of the unconscious that manifest in the life of the patient as neurotic 
behaviour. The major contradiction in this approach, which Freud himself acknowledged, 
is that the therapist is trying to deal with the “unconscious feelings” that are supposedly 
inaccessible in the caverns of the mind. Conversely, Buber saw the need for the therapist 
to “step outside the established rules of his school” and “gaze beyond the limits into a 
sphere which is not his sphere of work” (p. 111).  
From Buber’s perspective, this includes the sinful nature of humanity and the 
patient’s relationship with God. He acknowledges that this requires real personal 
commitment and engagement on behalf of the therapist. “A ‘doctor of souls’ who really 
is one – who does not merely carry on the work of healing but enters into it at time as a 
partner – is precisely one who dares” (p. 112). Fundamentally, Buber understood 
neuroses as an estrangement between the realms of I-it and I-Thou. It is through 
“meeting between” the two polarities of I-it and I Thou, and being genuinely interested 
in the other person that healing and “wholeness” can be experienced in the therapeutic 
relationship (Hycner, 1991).    
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Freud’s disciple, Carl Jung eventually broke away from his mentor’s thinking, 
viewing his psychosexual hypothesis as too simplistic and deterministic. Jung wanted to 
consider the role of myth, religion, and philosophy in treating neuroses. His interest in 
the religious dimensions of human’s psychological experience provided much greater 
scope for engagement with Buber.  
The Buber - Jung Dialogue  
In Buber’s polemical essay, Religion and Modern Thinking, which was published 
in his book The Eclipse of God (1952), he attacked the theories of a number of 20th 
century philosophical heavyweights, existentialists Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul 
Sartre, and psychologist Carl Jung. The main theme of his polemic “. . . is that the 
radical subjectivism of modern thought has blocked access to the transcendent, resulting 
in spiritual blindness to the living presence of God” (Seltzer in Buber, 1952, p. xviii). 
Stephens (2001) has suggested Buber’s critique of Jung revolves around three 
interrelated themes: the primacy of psychic truth, the nature of otherness in the human 
encounter, and most crucial, the nature of God and our relationship with Him. 
Discussion will primarily focus on these themes, within the context of the Buber-Jung 
discourse. 
Historically, Jung was the first psychologist to highlight the importance of the 
soul, myth, philosophy and religion in modern psychology. He went far beyond Freud, 
and towards Buber, in recognizing the therapeutic relationship as a dialogue between 
human-beings (Friedman, 2002). Whilst Jung agreed with Freud that the mind was 
divided into conscious and unconscious he did not agree with Freud that the unconscious 
mind was the source of “all” neurotic conflicts (Dourley, 1995). For Jung, the psyche is 
comprised of three parts: consciousness, the collective unconscious, and the personal 
unconscious (Palmer, 1997).  
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Jung contended that the unconscious mind was historically prior to consciousness, 
and comprised “archetypes” that were produced by the “collective unconscious”. He 
defined the collective unconscious as “a common substratum [of archetypes] 
transcending all differences in culture and consciousness” (Jung, 1968a, p. 249). The 
source of these archetypes lay in the religious and mythological systems that have 
shaped the history of humanity. The fundamental archetype of the collective unconscious 
is the “self”, an integrating principle of the human psyche, which is distinct from the 
conscious mind or ego and is “the archetype of the God-image” (Jung, 1968b, p. 10). Its 
symbolic meaning can be conceptualized in various ways, for example religious images 
such as Christ, Tao or Buddha. Jung (1952), however, admits that he makes a 
“transcendental speculation” (p. 18) about the existence and functions of the self and the 
collective unconscious. This has led Buber, and many contemporary psychologists, to 
reject or heavily criticize certain aspects of Jung’s thinking (Cox, 1968).   
In addition to the collective unconscious, Jung also suggests there is a “personal 
unconscious”, which derives from our personal history of family and culture. Within the 
personal unconscious there are repressed memories and elements of our psyche that have 
not been developed, which Jung described as the “shadow of the personality”. The 
primary objective of therapy for Jung is to redress any imbalances between the conscious 
and unconscious aspects of the psyche. Through this process of what Jung calls 
“individuation”, and what Buber would call I-Thou, the patient will hopefully encounter 
the “absolute”, leading to psychological healing and rehabilitation (Stephens, 2001).   
Although Jung has often been classified as one of the most important thinkers in 
20th century psychology, his eclecticism and strong links with Occult philosophy and 
alchemy (Gibbons, 2001), has meant he receives only a cursory note in most mainstream 
psychology text books (Passantino & Passantino, 1995). Jung was well aware of the 
reaction he would receive from the academic philosophers who would require empirical 
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evidence for his postulations. In a reply to Buber’s criticisms of his collective 
unconscious and psychological expositions of Gnosticism, Jung remarked that, 
“Intellectuals and rationalists, happy in their established beliefs, will no doubt be 
horrified by this and will accuse me of reckless eclecticism, as though I had somehow 
invented the facts of man’s nature and mental history…” from a “…theosophical brew” 
(Jung, 1952, p. 18). According to Gibbons (2001), Occult philosophy is so pervasive in 
Jung’s work that his “analytical psychology can be regarded as a reformed occultism in 
the strictest sense” (p.107) and “…might be considered as a secular spirituality” (p. 109). 
It is then understandable why Jung is often seen as the pioneer of humanistic-existential 
and transpersonal psychology, in which a wide-range of esoteric mystical literature is 
brought to bear (Levy, 1983). 
As Buber (1967b) had vehemently “turned against the popular reduction of God 
to a psychologicum” (p. 713), that is Jung’s reduction of God to a psychic function, it is 
not difficult to see the origin of the Buber-Jung disputations, or how some Catholic 
scholars have labeled Jung as an enemy of the Church (Thevathasan, 1998). This is 
principally based upon Jung’s docetic representation of Christ and rejection of the 
resurrection (Chapman, 1997). In light of this, Buber (1952) viewed Jung as “the leading 
psychologist of our day” who has “made religion in its historical and biographical forms 
the subject of comprehensive observations” (p. 78).  
Jung’s conception of God is totally incompatible with the Judeo-Christian 
orthodoxy of Buber (Dourley, 1995). In his lectures at the Washington (D.C.) School of 
Psychiatry in 1957, Buber describes Jung as a “…mystic of the modern, psychological 
type of solipsism” (Buber, 1999b, p. 113-114). Jung defines religion as “a living relation 
to psychical events which do not depend upon consciousness but instead take place on 
the other side of it in the darkness of the psychical hinterland” (Jung & Kerenyi, 1949, p. 
102). Thus, he conceives God as “autonomous psychic content” (p. 205) and the human 
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soul as the origin and locus of God. Paradoxically, Buber (1952) views divinity as “the 
absolute Other, the absolute over and against me” (p. 68). Jung’s naturalistic conception 
of God is the foundational basis for all Buber’s criticisms of Jung’s psychology and his 
understanding of the therapeutic relationship. 
Buber (1999b) concludes that Jung “oversteps with sovereign license the 
boundaries of psychology” (p. 46), offering no criterion for distinguishing between the 
religious and pseudo-religious. Whilst Buber was keen to articulate the Otherness and 
transcendent nature of God, he was also trying to correct the overemphasis of Rudolf 
Otto and Karl Barth on the “total” transcendence of God (Friedman, 1991, p. 343). In 
response to these criticisms, Jung berated Buber and other religious thinkers such as 
Victor White, a psychiatrist and Catholic priest, suggesting that they were among 
“people for one reason or another who think they know about unknowable things in the 
Beyond” (Buber, 1999b, p. 61). There is some truth in Jung’s argument, as Buber 
himself is at times guilty of claiming to know the legitimate boundaries of human 
knowledge and the divine, and how they interrelate. In a historical analysis of Buber’s 
philosophy, Herbert Schneider (1967) notes that during Buber’s dialogue with Jung he 
“allows himself to be tricked” into “discussing God’s independent existence” (p. 471). 
Whilst Buber normally adheres to a “situational analysis”, with the Judeo-Christian God 
as a truth position and starting point for his thesis, “he bursts occasionally into dogmatic 
utterance like a prophet, but behind his conviction is a well-grounded analysis of the 
available facts of religious experience” (p. 471). Although Buber’s I-Thou philosophy 
indicates some metaphysical speculation, it is Jung who is most guilty of unfounded 
conjecture. 
Jung had little time for metaphysics and erroneously viewed himself as an 
empiricist not a metaphysician. However, Jung stretched the term empiricism far beyond 
Hume’s original model to include dream material, hallucinations, archetypes, 
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mythologies, and religious folklore (Dourley, 1995, p. 79). In Buber’s rejoinder to Jung 
he states that Jung has done a disservice to “the science of psychology” by making 
unjustified statements and suggests that it is Jung’s personal abhorrence of orthodox 
religious faith that has led him to such speculation and ambiguity (Agassi, 1999, p. 70). 
The lack of coherence and eclecticism in Jung’s work is demonstrated in a recent study 
exploring the Buber-Jung disputations and their impact on the boundaries of 
contemporary analytical psychology (Stephens, 2001). Findings suggest that “splits 
within the Jungian community itself seem to be growing more frequent and violent” (p. 
455). Having established the key differences between Buberian and Jungian theory it is 
now important to show how this affects our understanding of the therapeutic relationship 
in psychotherapy.  
Jung “defines a person as a psychic system which, when it affects another person, 
enters into reciprocal reaction with another psychic system” (Friedman, 1985, p. 22). 
This is contrary to Buber’s dialogical theory, wherein God as the eternal Thou is the root 
of all authentic Thou encounters with other persons. Friedman comments on the 
superficiality of Jung’s theory and how ultimately the therapeutic relationship cannot be 
viewed as an authentic Thou encounter:  
For all Jung’s emphasis on rapport and mutual confidence, his ultimate vision of 
the therapist-patient relationship is one of two individuals psychic processes, 
each of which is aided through the interaction with the other, but each of which 
regards the other as a function of his own becoming. (p. 22) 
Following his mentor Freud, Jung makes the logical error of assuming a 
definitive split between the unconscious and conscious minds, whereas Buber discards 
this approach as a remnant of Cartesian-dualism and recognizes the need to approach 
therapy in a holistic manner that does not split the person into a dichotomy of warring 
psychic forces (Friedman, 2002). The unconscious for Buber and modern day dialogical 
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therapists, is not a phenomenon in itself, but a condition in which “the physical and 
psychological have not yet evolved and in which the two cannot be distinguished from 
one another” (Friedman, 2002, p. 15). With this in mind, it is the “meeting” between 
patient and therapist in the therapeutic relationship which is pivotal to the onset of 
healing. This is what Buber and Hans Trüb, the founder of the Dialogical therapy 
movement, describes as “healing through meeting” when the uniqueness and wholeness 
of the other person is acknowledged and ontological distinctions in the person-person 
relation are partially collapsed (Hycner, 1991, p. ix). Commenting on the role of 
psychotherapists in the post-script of I and Thou, he made a clear distinction between 
doing “successful . . . repair work” and “regeneration of an atrophied personal centre” 
(Buber, 1937/2003, p. 166). To achieve this, he saw the need for mutuality, openness, 
directness, and presence in the therapeutic relationship (Agassi, 1999). Following this, 
the use of techniques and theories are less important for Buber than the patient and client 
entering into a genuine I-Thou encounter. Nevertheless, Buber also stresses the need for 
the therapist to be more giving than the patient, what he called a “legitimate superiority” 
(Katz, 1975).  
In conclusion, although Jung appears to be a religious thinker and uses similar 
terminology to Buber to communicate his ideas, it is clear that their theories are 
fundamentally irreconcilable. However, while noting the many limitations of Jung’s 
biblical exegesis, Buber and contemporary Christian psychologists (e.g., Chapman, 1997; 
Stein, 1986) also acknowledge the usefulness of some of his ideas for Judeo-Christian 
psychotherapy.   
Conclusion 
This article provides a brief overview of Buber’s life and work, and his 
contribution to psychotherapy. His seminal theory of dialogue has had profound 
implications for psychotherapy, with hundreds of research studies showing that the 
   
17 
quality of the therapeutic relationship is related to therapy outcome (Yalom, 1980). 
Buber’s critique of Freud’s overt atheism and Jung and Rogers’ non-theocentrism, 
provided an important corrective to the “culture of detachment” (Browning, 1987) and 
cult of “self-worship” (Vitz, 1977/1994) that had previously dominated psychotherapy. 
What Buber offered in I and Thou was a clear articulation of orthodox Jewish 
anthropology, which he then used to devise a relational approach to psychotherapy. The 
Hebrew bible provides a monistic view of body, soul and spirit (nefesh – the living man) 
that are in a harmonious relationship (Kaplan & Schwartz, 1997). Hence, Buber’s vision 
of psychotherapy as a sacred encounter between therapist and patient, which above all 
should facilitate the quest for “human-wholeness”. There is little doubt that Buber’s 
contribution to the field has played a major role in the development of spiritual 
approaches in psychotherapy (Laing, Phillipson, & Lee, 1966), and explicit Jewish and 
Christian models of psychotherapeutic practice.     
Christian psychotherapists have acknowledged the usefulness of Buber’s I and 
Thou within their work. Olthuis (1994a,b, 1999) has advocated a relational 
psychotherapeutic model, which emphasizes the importance of “being-with” in the 
therapeutic relationship. Similar to Buber’s understanding of the “sphere of between” in 
the therapeutic alliance, “being-with” is characterized by mutuality and a reciprocal love 
that is grounded in God. Therefore, the role of the Christian psychotherapist is as a co-
partner with Christ in the ministry of grace within the healing process. Integral to 
“being-with” is “suffering-with”; that is entering into the depths of sin and brokenness of 
our clients. Drawing on the work of spiritual writer Henri J. M. Nouwen, Uomoto (1995) 
has emphasized the importance of “the practice of silence in listening for the suffering of 
others” within the therapist-patient dyad (p. 349). This closely mirrors Buber’s 
conception of psychotherapy as “an affair of listening obedience” (Buber, 1965, p.131), 
in which the therapist enters into a religious dialogue with the patient. He describes this 
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beautifully as when “. . . the heavenly bread of self-being is passed . . . from one man to 
another” (p. 71).  
As argued by others (e.g., Uomoto, 1995), it is suggested that to acquire a real 
“experiential” understanding of Buber’s (or closely related, Nouwen’s, 1990/1972) idea 
of “encountering of others” in the therapeutic relation (I-Thou), it is necessary for the 
therapist to have addressed their own wounds (in part). Of course, the healing of wounds 
can be a lifelong process and none of us are ever fully healed until death (Rev. 21: 4). 
But there is little doubt that on the road to Christian maturity there are milestones that 
fundamentally change our perception of who we are in Him. My understanding of my 
own brokenness came from the wound of infant adoption, the suicide of my biological 
birth mother, and a life lived without the knowledge of Christ, until five years ago. These 
experiences and the subsequent developmental journey of healing, which brought self-
understanding, liberation in what St. Paul calls a “spirit of sonship” (Rom. 8: 15), were 
only wrought through the power of the Holy Spirit and the counsel of others who had 
chosen to enter their own wounds. Understanding my own brokenness and through the 
wise counsel of others, has allowed me to better recognize and work with the brokenness 
of others.   
According to Buber it is the role of the psychotherapist to facilitate their clients 
to make choices that lead them to what Buber calls the “illumination of guilt”, the 
subsequent “shudder of identity” and eventually through “persevering in that 
illumination” to “repair . . . the injured order of existence” (see p. 10). Overlaying this 
process with the Christian narrative provides a model of psychotherapeutic practice that 
arguably could be constructed as follows. The client is convicted of their guilt 
(sinfulness) by the Holy Spirit (John. 16:8-9) and/or made aware of the impact of past 
traumas, which is facilitated through loving confrontation by the therapist. They then 
experience a lack of identity (despair, Kierkegaard, 1989/1849) that is the beginning of 
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finding greater identity in Christ. With the help of the therapist the client must then 
choose to invite Christ into their wounded past (the cross), and finally the client 
experiences healing, regeneration and to varying degrees “. . .  the glorious freedom of 
the children of God” (Rom. 8: 21).  
In practice, the client’s (or therapist’s) realization of their freedom and “spirit of 
sonship” is a path that is generally strewn with pain, anguish and tears (Rom. 8: 16-17), 
and only God knows the time and the way in which to deliver and heal the wounds of 
each person (Ecclesiastes 3:3). As a psychotherapist has what Buber calls a “legitimate 
superiority” in the therapeutic relationship, primarily based upon their training and 
experience, God no doubt uses this to bring much psychological and spiritual healing to 
their clients. Psychotherapeutic training, an extensive knowledge and experience are 
fundamental to the effectiveness of the therapeutic relationship and clinical outcome. 
Perhaps though, to really “encounter” the client, friend, or relative, those involved in 
soul care (psychotherapist, priest or lay counselor) must have walked into and through 
their own major wounds. God relishes a broken and contrite spirit (Psalm. 51: 17) and 
arguably will powerfully use those individuals who “know” Him to help reclaim the 
client’s “inner child” (Abrams, 1990). It is argued that within this sacred space of a real 
“encounter”, the “heavenly bread of self-being is passed” (Buber, 1965, p.71) between 
the therapist and client, and all psychological and psychiatric interventions are 
transcended. Of course, in a Christian framework the “heavenly bread” is the healing 
grace of God in the power of the Holy Spirit. There is little doubt that at times of real 
therapeutic intensity the “encounter” can become a form of “intercession”, where the 
therapist enters into the dark night of the soul with the client. 
In summary, it is suggested that Christian researchers and therapists could greatly 
benefit from reading Buber’s work and integrating some of his ideas into their practice. 
It is recommended that in order to get a true picture of the wider implications of his book 
   
20 
for both humanity’s individual and corporate relations,  readers should first tackle 
reading  I-Thou. It is a very challenging little book that needs considerable thought and 
reflection, but is well worth the effort! Readers are then directed to Judith Buber 
Agassi’s (1999) recent text, which includes an excellent collection of his essays on 
psychotherapy, and dialogues and correspondences with the likes of Freud, Jung, Trüb 
and Rogers. For further reading on Jewish psychotherapy, see Volume twenty three, 
issue 3 of the Journal of Psychology and Judaism, which is dedicated to Hebraic 
psychotherapy. In particular, readers are encouraged to read the article by Kaplan and 
Schwartz (1997), which provides an interesting and scholarly analysis of Greek and 
biblical anthropology, and outlines the usefulness of patriarchal narratives in the practice 
of psychotherapy.  
The majority of Buber’s contribution to the theory of psychotherapy is based 
upon his dialogical philosophy. In the history of ideas, the publication of Buber’s I and 
Thou will stand as a milestone in revolutionizing our understanding of the relational 
nature of humanity (Hycner, 1991). In turn, it has provided an invaluable source of 
wisdom for psychotherapists and all those involved in soul care.  
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